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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
COMMENTARY
Commercial Banking—How Can a Bank Become a Holder and
Give Value in Order to Attain Holder in Due Course Status?—
Bowling Green, Inc. v. State Street Bank & Trust Co. When a
non-banking entity seeks to establish its status as a holder in due
course, the Uniform Commercial Code' requires compliance with the
conditions of section 3-302(1).' The Code specifically exempts com-
mercial banking institutions from full compliance with section 3-
302(1).° In view of the special privileges' accorded a holder in due
course, the question arises whether there is any reason for relaxing
these requirements when the claimant is a large commercial bank.
More specifically, do the complexity' and magnitude° of modern
commercial banking warrant modification of some of the provisions
of Articles Three and Four in the light of commercial reality or the
original intentions of the parties to a controversy?
In Bowling Green, Inc. v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 7 the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit confronted these broad issues
in the specific context of the manner in which a bank may achieve
holder in due course status. It is the purpose of this note to demon-
strate that the court misinterpreted and misapplied the Uniform Com-
mercial Code in resolving the holder in due course issues presented in
Bowling Green.
1
 All Uniform Commercial Code citations are to the 1962 Official Text.
2 U.C.C. § 3-302(1) provides:
A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any de-
fense against or claim to it on the part of any person.
8
 U.C.C. f 3-302(1) (a) requires value be given and U.C.C.
	 3-303 defines what
constitutes the giving of value for Article 3 purposes. U.C.C. 11 4-208 and 4-209 provide
an expanded definition of value, applicable only to banks: a bank has given value to the
extent that it has obtained a security interest in the instrument. The text of if 4-208
and 4-209 are printed at notes 14 and 15 infra.
4
 Section 3-305 of the U.C.C. provides that a holder in due course takes an instru-
ment free from all claims to it on the part of any person, and all defenses of any party
with whom the holder has not dealt, with the exception of certain real defenses.
3 The Comment to 1 4-101 states that the provisions of this Article are consistent
with the recognized complexity of modern banking.
The New York Law Revision Commission Reports indicate that the Chase-Man-
hattan Bank, in a single year, collected and paid through clearings over 247,700,000 checks
whose approximate value was 164 billion dollars. 1 New York Law Revision Commission
Reports, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code 199 (1954),
7 425 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1970). The trial court opinion is reported in 307 F. Supp.
648 (D. Mass. 1969).
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Bowling Green entered into a conditional sales contract with the
Bowl-Mor Company under which Bowling Green agreed to purchase
automatic candlepin setting equipment. On September 26, 1966, Bowl-
ing Green, in payment of the first of three installments, negotiated a
check to Bowl-Mor in the amount of $15,306. 8 The check was given
to Bowling Green by the Small Business Administration pursuant to
a loan agreement. It was drawn on the United States Treasury by the
Small Business Administration. On the morning of the next day, Sep-
tember 27, 1966, Bowl-Mor deposited the check in its checking ac-
count at the State Street Bank & Trust Co. The check was not endorsed
by Bowl-Mor, but, in accordance with accepted banking procedure
authorized under section 4-205,° the Bank filled in the necessary en-
dorsement and immediately applied the funds to Bowl-Mor's check-
ing account. Prior to this deposit, Bowl-Mor had an overdraft in its
checking account in the amount of $5,024.85. A credit from the Bank,
traceable to the check, removed the overdraft and the account was
credited with $10,047.54.°
On the afternoon of September 26th, Bowl-Mor petitioned for
reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. Later in the
day, the Bank, when advised of the petition, transferred the $10,047.54
remaining in Bowl-Mor's checking account to a loan account which
Bowl-Mor had at the Bank. Bowl-Mor was indebted to the Bank
because of a series of short-term loans which the Bank had made to
it during previous months. Under the terms of these loans, the Bank
acquired a security interest in Bowl-Mor's products, after-acquired
property, and in the proceeds of its chattel paper. The check in ques-
tion, representing payment for goods sold under a contract of sale,
constituted such proceeds."
At the request of the receiver appointed under Chapter X, the
Bank, on September 29, 1966, withdrew the $10,047.54 from the loan
account and credited it to the checking account. Six days later, the
Chapter X petition was dismissed and the Bank again transferred the
money to the loan account. Bowl-Mor's financial problems came to a
head on February 15, 1967, when it was adjudged bankrupt. During
the period from September 26, 1966 to February 15, 1967, Bowl-Mor
did not deliver any equipment under its contract with Bowling Green
nor did it return any money to Bowling Green. Bowling Green initiated
8 The check was not introduced into evidence. 307 F. Supp. at 653.
9 U.C.C. § 4-205(1), provides:
A depositary bank which has taken an item for collection may supply any en-
dorsement of the customer which is necessary to title unless the item contains the
words "payee's endorsement required" or the like. In the absence of such a re-
quirement a statement placed on the item by the depositary bank to the effect
that the item was deposited by a customer or credited to his account is effec-
tive as the customer's endorsement.
10 The remainder of the original deposit, $233.61, was transferred by State Street to
another account which Bowl-Mor maintained at the Bank. This amount was not in issue.
425 F.2d at 82.
11 The definition of proceeds may be found in U.C.C. 9-306(1). Chattel paper is
defined in U.C.C. II 9-105(1) (b).
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an action in federal district court's claiming that the Bank held the
proceeds of the check impressed with a constructive trust in plaintiff's
favor.'' The district court found that the Bank was a holder in due
course and was entitled to the proceeds of the check.
The two important issues which faced the court in Bowling Green
were, first, whether the Bank had to establish that it was a holder of
the item in order to achieve holder in due course status, and second,
whether the Bank gave "value," within the meaning of section 4-208,"
when it received the check. The court of appeals HELD: "A bank
which takes an item for collection from a customer who was himself
a holder need not establish that it took the item by negotiation in order
to satisfy 4-2092 1' The court further held that the Bank's pre-existing
security interest, as defined by section 1-201(37), 18
 in the proceeds of
Bowl-Mor's chattel paper, was sufficient to constitute the value re-
quired by section 3-302.
In order for the Bank to take the instrument free from Bowling
Green's personal claims against Bowl-Mor, the Bank had to establish
its status as a holder in due course." Both the official text of section
12
 The basis of federal jurisdiction was diversity of citizenship.
13
 Bowling Green wanted to have State Street declared a constructive trustee of
the money deposited in Bowl-Mor's account. It argued that "Bowl-Mor knew it could
not perform at the time it accepted payment, that the Bank was aware of this fraudulent
conduct and that the Bank, therefore, received Bowl-Mot's deposit impressed with a
constructive trust in plaintiff's favor." 425 F.2d at 83.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's finding that State Street acted
in good faith when it received the check. The court applied the subjective test, not the
objective test as contended for by Bowling Green. The subjective test is embodied in
U.C.C. § 1-201(19). Accord, Pazol v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 110 Ga. App. 319, 138 S.E.2d
442 (1964) ; Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Ft. Lee Say. & Loan Ass'n, 89 N.J. Super. 43, 213
A.2d 315 (1965) ; Citizens Bank of Booneville v, National Bank of Commerce, 334 F.2d
257 (10th Cir. 1964). See also Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial
Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 666 (1963) ; 1
New York Law Revision Commission Reports, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code
at 203-06, 21343, 424-26, 518-31.
14 U.C.C. 4-208(1) provides:
A bank has a security interest in an item and any accompanying documents
or the proceeds of either
(a) in case of an item deposited in an account to the extent to which credit
given for the item has been withdrawn or applied;
(b) in case of an item for which it has given credit available for withdrawal
as of right, to the extent of the credit given whether or not the credit
is drawn upon and whether or not there is a right of charge-back; or
(c) if it makes an advance on or against the item.
15 425 F.2d at 84. U.C.C. 4-209 provides:
For purposes of determining its status as a holder in due course, the bank
has given value to the extent that it has a security interest in an item provided
that the bank otherwise complies with the requirements of Section 3-302 on
what constitutes a holder in due course.
The provisions of this section are not, as the court indicates, in and of themselves
susceptible of being satisfied by the bank.
16 U.C.C. I 1-201(37), provides in part that "'security interest' means an interest
in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation."
17 The rights of a holder in due course are set forth in note 4 supra. U.C.C. § 3-306
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3-302(0,18 ("(a) holder in due course is a holder who takes the in-
strument . . ."), and the great weight of authority" make dear the
proposition that a party must be a holder before he can become a
holder in due course.
"Holder" status can be attained only through the process of nego-
tiation. An instrument, such as the check in this case, which is payable
to the order of a named individual, can be negotiated only by delivery
and endorsement by the transferee. 2° When negotiation occurs, then,
under the definition of "holder" in section 1-201 (20), 21 the transferee
becomes a "holder."
The court stated that since there was no evidence that Bowl-Mor
endorsed the check, it could not determine whether the Bank became
a holder under section 1-201(20). 22 The court, however, did not re-
gard this lack of endorsement as conclusive on the holder issue which
it phrased in these terms: "whether [the Bank] must establish that it
took the item in question by endorsement in order to meet its bur-
den."23
 The court then reasoned that since the Bank's depositor was a
holder," the Bank, under the provisions of section 3-201(0,28 by
acquiring all of the rights of its transferor, became a holder. The
court's analysis and application of section 3-201(1) is open to serious
correspondingly provides that one who is not a holder in due course takes an instrument
subject "to all valid claims to it on the part of any person."
18 The text of * 3-302(1) is set forth in note 2 supra.
12 See W. WiHier & F. Hart, 1 Forms & Procedures Under the U.C.C. § 34.06(2)
(1969) [hereinafter cited as WUlier & Hart]: "The first requisite of a holder in due
course is that he be a holder." See also Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 345 Mass. I, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962) ; Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Ft. Lee Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 89 N.J. Super. 43, 213 A.2d 315 (1965) ; Pazol v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 110
Ga. App. 319, 138 S.E.2d 442 (1964): Hinge v. Robinson, 204 Pa. Super. 404, 204 A.2d
279 (1964). W. Hawkland,, Commercial Paper & Bank Deposits and Collections at 183
(1967) ; White, Some Petty Complaints About Article 3, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1315 (1967) ;
Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 Yale L.J. 185 (1967) ; 2
New York Law Revision Commission Reports, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code
at 1325.
20 U.C.C. § 3-202(1) provides:
Negotiation is the transfer of an instrument in such form that the trans-
feree becomes a holder. If the instrument is payable to order it is negotiated by
delivery with any necessary endorsement; if payable to bearer it is negotiated by
delivery.
at In U.C.C. § 1-201(20), "Holder" is defined as: "a person who is in possession
of a document of title or an instrument or an investment security drawn, issued or
endorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank."
22 425 F.2d at 83.
23 Id. at 84.
24 The facts indicate that Bowling Green endorsed and delivered the check to B owl-
Mor, Id. at 83. Under U.C.C. 1-201(20) Bowl-Mor therefore became a holder of the
check.
28 U.C.C. § 3-201(1) provides:
Transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee such rights as the transferor
has therein, except that a transferee who has himself been a party to any fraud
or illegality affecting the instrument or who as a prior holder had notice of a
defense or claim against it cannot improve his position by taking from a later
holder in due course.
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question. This section recognizes the concept that a transferee of an
instrument takes by the transfer all of the rights of his transferor. If
these rights also include the right to become a holder even though
a necessary endorsement was missing, which is what the court seems
to suggest, there would be no difference between transfer and nego-
tiation. One would not need to take by negotiation to become a holder.
That such a meaningful difference does exist is evident from the fact
that the Uniform Commercial Code has provided a separate section
on negotiation," and has authorized a transferee to demand the en-
dorsement of his transferor. 27
In sections 1-201(20) and 3-202(1), the Code expressly provides
that a person may only become a holder if the instrument is taken by
negotiation; no other method of attaining holder status is provided."
The distinction between transfer and negotiation is further emphasized
by the fact that if the instrument is merely the subject of a transfer,
Article Three has limited application, while if it is negotiated, Article
Three governs the rights and liabilities of the parties." To accentuate
the necessity of negotiation, section 3-201(3) gives the transferee the
unqualified right to the endorsement of his transferor. This allows the
transferee to compel negotiation and become a holder in his own right.
The rationale of the court's decision renders these sections of the Code
superfluous. The rights referred to in section 3-201(1) may not be the
same as those which are granted to a holder under Articles Three and
Four.a° The rights acquired by the transfer considered in section
3-201(1) may not amount to title, while if the instrument is nego-
tiated, title passes.ai In order for a transferee to become a holder, with
the rights accorded a holder, he must get the endorsement of his trans-
feror and thereby complete negotiation." The Bank did not, then,
obtain the rights of a holder merely by the transfer; in order to obtain
26 U.C.C.	 3-202(1). The text of this section is printed at note 20 supra.
27 U.C.C. § 3-201(3).
29 Further support for the proposition that a transferee needs the endorsement of
his transferor if he is to become a holder may be found in 2 New York Law Revision
Commission Reports, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code at 849, where it is
stated: "[a] negotiable instrument may be the subject of a gift .. and the gift of
an instrument, if it is properly endorsed, will constitute a negotiation making the donee
a holder. . ." See also Id. at 850-51. In Koreska v. United Cargo Corp., 23 App. Div.
2d 37, 258 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1965) it was held that a transferee of a negotiable bill of lading
was not a holder under 1-201(20) since there was no showing that the bill was en-
dorsed by the transferor,
29 Willier & Hart, supra note 19, at 1 34.02.
89 See Jett v. Atlanta Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 104 Ga. App. 688, 123 S.E.2d 27
(1961), and Dluge v. Robinson, 204 Pa. Super. 404, 204 A.2d 279 (1964). In Dluge, the
court held that plaintiff could not maintain an action under U.C.C. 3-804 since be was
not a holder, but a transferee. See also E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank,
259 F. Supp. 513 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
81 U.C.C. § 3-201, Comment 1.
82 U.C.C. §i 3-201(1) and 3-201(3). In Woodhouse, Drake & Carey, Ltd. v. An-
derson, 61 Misc. 951, 307 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1970), the court, relying on U.C.C. 1 3-201(3),
held that the plaintiff was a holder in due course despite the fact that the note was en-
dorsed after a prior transfer.
286
CASE NOTE
these rights it had to obtain Bowl-Mor's endorsement. A contrary
conclusion would not be consonant with the provisions of Article Three.
To strengthen its conclusion that the Bank need not take by nego-
tiation and need not establish that it is a holder, the court expressed
doubt that the concept of holder, as expressed in section 1-201(20),"
applied to Article Four with full force." To support this proposition
the court cited section 4-201(1)" which states that the lack of an en-
dorsement does not affect a bank's status as the depositor's agent for
purpose of collection, and section 4-205," which permits a bank to
supply a depositor's missing endorsement. Finally, the court stated
that it did not consider the concept of holder relevant to Article Four
because section 4-209" applies only to good faith, value and notice,
and not to holder status, "a status which section 3-302 assumes rather
than requires."'
A bank's right to be a holder in due course is expressly recognized
in section 4-209." Section 4-209 provides that a bank, in order to
achieve holder in due course status, must fully comply with section
3-302, with the exception that a bank may also give value in the man-
ner set forth in section 4-209. Therefore, the requirement of section
3-302 that a holder in due course must be a holder is a requirement
under section 4-209.° That section 3-302 "assumes" holder status
does not mean that it is not required by the section. In fact, the
court's "assumption" argument amounts to little more than a play on
words.
The recognition in section 4-201(1) of the prima facie agency
status of a collecting bank is consistent with prevailing law and prac-
88 The text of U.C.C. § 1-201(20) is printed at note 21 supra.
84 425 F.2d at 84.
85 U.C.C. § 4-201(1) provides:
Unless a contrary intent clearly appears and prior to the time that a settle-
ment given by a collecting bank for an item is or becomes final (subsection (3)
of Section 4-211 and Sections 4-212 and 4-213) the bank is an agent or sub-agent
of the owner of the item and any settlement given for the item is provisional.
This provision applies regardless of the form of endorsement or lack of endorse-
ment and even though credit given for the item is subject to immediate with-
drawal as of right or is in fact withdrawn; but the continuance of ownership of
an item by its owner and any rights of the owner to proceeds of the item are
subject to rights of a collecting bank such as those resulting from outstanding
advances on the item and valid rights of setoff. When an item is handled by banks
for purposes of presentment, payment and collection, the relevant provisions of
this Article apply even though action of parties clearly establishes that a partic-
ular bank has purchased the item and is the owner of it.
88 The text of U.C.C. § 4-205 is printed at note 9 supra.
ST The text of U.C.C. § 4-209 is printed at note 15 supra.
88 425 F.2d at 84.
80 The text of U.C.C. § 4-209 is printed at note 15 supra.
40 U.C.C. § 4-102 provides that where the terms of Article 4 are in conflict with
those of Article 3, the provisions of Article 4 are to govern. Since there is no conflict
between § 3-302 and § 4-209, the provisions of § 3-302 must be complied with by a bank
attempting to attain the status of holder in due course, including the requirement that
it be a holder.
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tice.41
 When a check is deposited for collection, ownership of the item
remains in the depositor and, while it is an agent, the bank is not
subject to liabilities which might be imposed upon the owner.' Section
4-201(1) indicates that a depositary bank is the agent of its depositor
whether or not the instrument is endorsed. The court drew on this sec-
tion to argue that the concept of holder is not applicable to Article
Four. But section 4-201(2) plainly recognizes that a bank becomes a
holder when an item is endorsed." To reason from the fact that a bank
is its depositor's agent for purposes of collection of an item despite the
lack of an endorsement, to the conclusion that a bank need not take
by negotiation in order to be a holder in due course, is not a proper
interpretation of the section. Section 4-201 recognizes the distinction
between a bank's position as the collecting agent of its depositor and
its position as a holder of the item. The latter concept is not subsumed
by the former."
The court's reference to the ability of a bank to supply a missing
endorsement" as an indication that "the concept of holder as defined
in section 1-201(20) does not apply with full force to Article 4" is
similarly unsound." A contrary implication should be drawn: the
right recognized under section 4-205 (1) is an indication of the impor-
tance of a bank taking by negotiation and thereby becoming a holder.
The court could have, by properly applying the Code, reached the
result that the Bank was a holder. Under section 3-202(1) delivery
and endorsement of order paper constitute negotiation and the realiza-
tion of holder status. Section 4-205(1), in order to permit items to
move more rapidly through banking channels, 47
 allows a depositary
bank to supply the missing endorsement of a depositor so long as there
are no accompanying restrictions." This relieves a bank of the neces-
sity of returning items for endorsement, a formidable task in light
of the number of checks received daily by banks. The effect of this
section is, therefore, not to limit the effects of holder status in Article
Four, but to recognize the necessity of holder status, and to give banks
41 U.C.C. § 4-201, Comment 3.
42 U.C.C. § 4-201, Comment 4.
4a U.C.C. § 4-201(2) provides: "[sifter an item has been endorsed with the words
`pay any bank' or the like, only a bank may acquire the rights of a holder. . . ." See 1
Willier & Hart, supra note 19, at § 43.02, and 2 New York Law Revision Commission
Reports, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code at 1286. See also Investment Serv.
Co. v. Martin Bros. Container & Timber Prod. Corp.,—Ore---, 465 P.2d 868 (1970),
where the Supreme Court of Oregon held that a depositary bank becomes a holder when,
under U.C.C. 4-205, it supplies its depositor's endorsement.
44 See Pazol v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 110 Ga. App. 319, 138 S.E.2d 442 (1964) ;
Funk, Banks and the Uniform Commercial Code 134 (1964) ; Russell, Article 4: Bank
Deposits and Collections, 29 Mo. L. Rev. 411 (1964).
40 U.C.C. § 4-205(1). The text of this section is printed at note 9 supra.
4e 425 F.2d at 84. The text of U.C.C. 1-201(20) is printed at note 21 supra. See
Investment Serv. Co. v. Martin Bros. & Container & Timber Prod. Co.,— Ore. —,
465 P.2d 868 (1970).
47 U.C.C. 9 4-205, Comment 2.
48 U.C.C. 3-205 specifies when an endorsement is restrictive.
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another method of obtaining the necessary endorsement. This section
should be construed as emphasizing the importance of the holder con-
cept in Article Four.
In light of the caveat in section 4-205(1) that the bank's right to
provide the endorsement is subject to restrictions that may appear on
the check, it is important to note that the check in the instant case
was not introduced into evidence. The check was issued by the Small
Business Administration and was drawn on the U.S. Treasury."
Treasury checks usually have restrictions on the reverse side cover-
ing the endorsements. One commentator has argued that "a bank would
not be authorized to supply the payee's endorsement on a check by
the United States Government since Treasury regulations customarily
require the payee's endorsement on government checks, even where
such checks themselves bear no legend requiring endorsement."" The
facts of the case indicate that Bowling Green was the named payee
on the check. Since the Bank's depositor, Bowl-Mor, was not a payee,
the Treasury restrictions would not have been applicable and the Bank
would have been free, under section 4-205(1), to supply Bowl-Mor's
endorsement. The Bank would therefore have qualified as a bolder
under section 1-201(20). If the court had determined that the Bank
was a holder, it would have avoided its untenable conclusion that the
Bank need not take by negotiation in order to be a holder in due
course. Delivery and endorsement need not, in order to complete nego-
tiation, occur simultaneously. The endorsement authorized under
section 4-205(1) is equivalent to the depositor's endorsement by his
own hand.
Neither the fact that section 4-201(1) recognizes a bank's agency
status, despite lack of endorsement, or that section 4-205(1) permits
the bank to supply a missing endorsement, leads to the conclusion
that the concept of holder is not required by Article Four as a pre-
requisite to a bank achieving holder in due course status. Further, the
fact that an item is transferred from a person qualifying as a holder
does not, under section 3-201(1), warrant the conclusion that the
transferee thereby becomes a holder. The court should have con-
cluded that in order for the Bank to become a holder, it had to acquire
the check by negotiation .m The court's decision that the Bank need
not take by negotiation in order to achieve holder status rests upon a
misapplication of the governing Code sections in an effort by the
court to achieve a result it believed was intended by the parties."
The second problem facing the Bank in establishing its status as
a holder in due course was proving it gave value for the check. No
problem was presented as to whether the Bank gave value for that
49 307 F. Supp. at 650.
59 H. Bailey, Brady on Bank Checks, § 8.10 (1969). See also J. Clarke, H. Bailey &
R. Young, Bank Deposits & Collections 59 (1963).
si U.C.C. § 3-201, Comment 7 provides: "there is no effective negotiation until the
endorsement is made. Until that time the purchaser does not become a bolder. . . ."
ea See excerpt from the court's opinion, note 70 infra.
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portion of the check ($5,024.84) which was immediately applied to
Bowl-Mor's overdraft. Crediting the overdraft constitutes the giving
of value as defined in section 3-303 (b)," which states that a holder
gives value when an amount is taken in payment of an antecedent
debt." As to whether the Bank had given value for the remaining
$10,047.54, the court of appeals held that it was crucial that this be
determined as of the time the Bank received the check for deposit, not
at the time it initially credited Bowl-Mor's loan account."
In finding that the Bank did give value, the court relied on section
4-209 which states that a bank has given value to the extent that it has
a security interest in the item. The court reasoned that since the
Bank had a pre-existing security interest in the proceeds of Bowl-
Mor's chattel paper, and since the check represented such proceeds,
the Bank had given value for the remaining $10,047.54. The court
used the general definition of security interest found in section
1-201 (37) ." and stated that there is no evidence that the term "secu-
rity interest" is used in a narrower sense in section 4-209. The court
then pointed out that both section 3-303 and the official comment to
section 4-209 provide that a holder gives value when he takes an in-
strument in payment for an antecedent debt. The court then con-
cluded that the Bank had given value, not because it had a security
interest under section 4-208," but because of its pre-existing secu-
rity interest in Bowl-Mor's chattel paper and proceeds. The pre-existing
interest alone, without application of the check to it, was sufficient, in
the court's view, to constitute the giving of value. The fact that this
security interest was not created under Article Four, the fact that the
lInnic did not, unon receipt of the check, apply it to the pre-existing
obligation. and the fact that the Bank received the check in the capac-
ity of a depositary-collecting bank and not as a secured creditor, did
not influence the court's conclusion that a security interest is a security
interest however acquired. The purpose of this section of the note is
53 U.C.C. f 3-303 provides:
A holder takes the instrument for value
(a) to the extent that the agreed consideration has been performed or that
he acquires a security interest in or a lien on the instrument otherwise
than by legal process; or
(b) when he takes the instrument in payment of or as security for an an-
tecedent claim against any person whether or not the claim is due; or
(e) when he gives a negotiable instrument for it or makes an irrevocable
commitment to a third person.
54 See Citizens Bank of Booneville v. National Bank of Commerce, 334 F.2d 257,
261 (10th Cir. 1964).
55 The court reasoned that "[t]he Bank may well have given value under
4-208(1) (a) when it credited the balance of Bowl-Mor's checking account against its
outstanding indebtedness. But by that time the Bank knew of Bowl-Mor's petition for
reorganization. . . ." 425 F.2d at 86. If the question of value was considered from the
date the Bank credited the loan account, serious questions of Its good faith and whether
it had notice of a claim would have arisen.
53 A portion of the text of § 1-201(37) is printed at note 16 supra.
57 The text of § 4-208(1) is printed at note 14 supra.
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to show that there is a difference between the two types of security in-
terests, and that the court's interpretation of section 4-209 is erroneous.
Depositary banks" taking items for collection are granted holder
in due course status as a means of protection. In a typical situation a
check is drawn on another bank, the payor bank,5° by a third party.
The payee takes the check to his bank and deposits the item in his
checking account. The depositary bank credits the account in the
amount of the check and forwards the item for collection. The credit
given the depositor is provisional" and remains provisional until final
settlementm is made by the payor bank. Until final settlement, the
depositary bank is acting as its depositor's agent" for purposes of col-
lection. As a matter of custom, banks allow depositors to draw against
checks deposited before final payment is made. In many instances,
such withdrawals are made and the check is subsequently dishonored.
To reconcile this difficulty, the Code allows the depositary bank to
acquire ownership rights in the check only to the extent that it has
allowed withdrawals. The legal capacity through which a bank exer-
cises its rights as owner is that of a holder in due course. The bank's
rights as a holder in due course exist only insofar as it has allowed a
depositor to withdraw, or to the extent that it has allowed the money
represented by the check to be used to cancel or diminish a pre-existing
debt."
Section 4-209 indicates that a bank has given value to the extent
that it has a security interest in the instrument. The official comment
states that this section "completes the thought of the previous sec-
tion." The previous section, 4-208(1), sets forth various situations
which will give rise to a security interest in favor of a depositary bank.
It should be noted that these security interests are created only for
Article Four purposes and are distinct from the more general concept
of security interest reflected in section 1-201(37)." This latter section
makes no reference to Articles Three and Four although several cross
references are made to Articles Two and Nine. This construction sup-
ports the conclusion that the types of security interests created in sec-
tion 4-208 are of a limited nature, confined to Article Four, and that
those referred to in section 1-201(37) are not meant to expand upon
those in Article Four. Thus, only the security interests created by
section 4-208 constitute value for purposes of determining whether a
depositary bank has given value. Additional support for this view is
provided by section 1-201, which indicates that the definitions within
that section are subject to additional definitions found in other Articles,
58 In U.C.C. § 4-105(a) a depositary bank is defined as the "first bank to which an
item is transferred for collection...."
62 In U.C.C. § 4-105(b) a payor bank is defined as "a bank by which an item is
payable as drawn."
60 U.C.C. 4-201(1). The text of this section is printed at note 35 supra.
61 U.C.C. § 4-104(1) ()).
62 U.C.C. § 4-201(1). The text of this section is printed at note 35 supra.
88 U.C.C. § 3-303. The text of this section is printed at note 53 supra.
84 The text of § 1-201(37) is printed at note 16 supra.
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"unless the context otherwise requires!"aa There is no indication that
sections 4-208 or 4-209 do otherwise require and, therefore, the defini-
tion of security interest in section 4-208 is controlling. The underlying
reasons for giving a bank security interest, and the overall application
of the relevant sections of the Code point up the difference between
the Bank's pre-existing security interest and the one granted the Bank
as its depositor's agent.
Further evidence for the conclusion that the Bank bad not given
value may be found from an examination of the functional aspects of
sections 4-208 and 4-209. Under section 4-208(1), a bank is given a
security interest to the extent that it has actually given value. This
occurs when credit which has been granted has been actually drawn
against, where the credit given may be drawn upon as a matter of
right whether or not it is in fact drawn upon, or where the bank
makes an advance on or against the item." The requirements of this
section are similar to the concepts of value put forth in Article Three."
The requirements, basic to each Article, are that "value" is something
actually given, or something given in the form of an irrevocable com-
mitment.
Neither section 4-208 nor section 3-303 recognizes that a bank has
given value merely because it has a security interest in the proceeds
of its depositor's chattel paper. At the time the check is received for
deposit, the existence of this security interest, created under Article
Nine of the Code, does not satisfy the requirement that value actually
be given. If upon receiving the check, the Bank immediately credited
the loan account in the amount of $10,047.54, it would have actually
given value as required by section 4-208. Instead, the Bank credited
the checking account and did not apply the money to the loan account
until after it learned of the petition for reorganization. As was pointed
out above, the court held that holder in due course status had to be
determined at the point in time when the Bank received the check. In
situations similar to Bowling Green, the courts have decided that a
collecting bank acquires a security interest, thereby satisfying the
value requirement, when the sums representing checks deposited are
immediately applied toward a debt secured by a pre-existing security
interest held by the bank. In New Waterford Bank v. Freeman," the
bank held a depositor's note secured by a chattel mortgage. When the
depositor placed $9,942.07 in his checking account, the bank immedi-
ately credited the loan account with $6,700, debited the checking
ea U.C.C. I 1-201, General Definitions, provides that the general definitions here
are: "[slubfeet to additional definitions contained in the subsequent Articles of this Act
which are applicable to specific Articles or Parts thereof, and unless the context other-
wise requires, . ."
ag The text of U.C.C. 4-208(1) (a) is printed at note 14 supra. See Peoples Bank of
Aurora v. Haar, 421 P.2d 817 (Okla. 1966) ; Citizens Bank of Boonville v. National
Bank of Commerce, 334 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1964) ; Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Ft. Lee Say.
& Loan Asen, 89 N.J. Super. 43, 213 A.2d 315 (1965).
67 See 3-303. The text of this section is printed at note 53 supra.
68 31 Pa. D. & C. 2d 773 (1963). 	 . ,
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account, and cancelled the note. The court found that the bank gave
value and had a security interest in the check to the extent that it
credited the loan account. Like the State Street Bank, the New Water-
ford Bank had a security interest created by earlier loans to its depos-
itor. In New Waterford, however, it was not the existence of this
security interest which satisfied the value requirement. Rather, it was
the application of the sum represented by the check against the loan
account which gave the bank the security interest contemplated by
section 4-208. There are, then, two security interests in these cases:
one created by a loan and not in and of itself constituting value for
holder in due course purposes, and a second created in the bank's favor
when it applies money from the check against the prior loan. It is
this second security interest which gives rise to value so that the bank
can become a holder in due course of the check. Through this pro-
cedure the bank acquires an interest in the check which it can exercise
in its own name if the check is not honored. Also illustrative of this
point is Citizens National Bank of Booneville v. National Bank of
Commerce." In that case a depositary bank was held to have a security
interest in an item presented for collection since it credited the de-
positor's overdue loan account in the amount of the check. Again, it
was not the existence of the security interest created by the loan ac-
count which constituted value for holder in due course purposes, but
the application of the check to the loan.
Both New Waterford and Citizens National Bank indicate that
when the Bank received the check for deposit it did not acquire the
requisite security interest and therefore did not give value. The bank
did not, then, attain holder in due course status.
The concluding paragraph of the opinion may better reflect the
underlying rationale of the court's decision than an analysis of the
court's application of the Code. The court seems to indicate that its
holding reflects the true intentions of the parties, and that justice
would not be served by allowing these intentions to be avoided through
the manipulation of technical provisions of the statute.7° From this
point of view the court's decision may be correct" and its holding just.
or' 334 F.2d 257 (lath Cir. 1964). See also Nicklaus v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co.,
258 F. Supp. 482 (E. D. Ark. 1965), where the bank was deemed to have given value
when it accepted a check in total satisfaction of a pre-existing debt.
70 The court observed:
We see no discrepancy between this result and the realities of commercial life.
Each party, of course, chose to do business with an eventually irresponsible third
party. The Bank, though perhaps unwise in prolonging its hopes for a prospering
customer, nevertheless protected itself through security arrangements as far as
possible without hobbling each deposit and withdrawal. Plaintiff, on the other
hand, not only placed the initial faith in Bowl-Mor, but later became aware that
Bowl-Mor was having difficulties in meeting its payroll. It seems not too unjust
that this vestige of caveat emptor survives.
425 F.2d at 87.
71 Some support for the court's approach may be found in Security Trust & Say.
Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 269 F. Supp. 893 (D. Mont. 1967)
where the court held that since no party to the check was damaged because of a missing
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The result reached, however, was founded upon a misapplication of
relevant Code sections. It is regrettable that neither party to the con-
troversy saw fit to introduce the check into evidence; many questions
raised by the case may have been better answered if this had been done.
The court's analysis of the Uniform Commercial Code will do little
to further concepts of uniformity and predictability in commercial
law. The court has expanded the concept of what constitutes value by
not requiring that value actually be given when the check is received.
The court further held that a bank seeking the status of a holder in
due course need not take by negotiation and therefore need not qualify
as a holder. The decision effectively emasculates the concept of holder
in due course in that it will allow banks to attain that status without
full compliance with the provisions of Articles Three and Four.
ALAN RICHARD ATKINS
endorsement, the drawee bank would be able to maintain an action. In Nicklaus v.
Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 258 F. Supp. 482 (E D. Ark. 1965), the court held that a bank
accepting a check acted in good faith even though it knew that the person tendering the
check was insolvent. This would support the court's attitude toward State Street's con-
tinued financial assistance to a failing company.
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